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Abstract The European football industry has suffered an unprecedented shock from 
COVID-19. In this chapter, we reflect on how the sport’s administrators responded to the 
initial outbreaks and what lessons can be learned. We also look ahead to what football 
in the post-COVID-19 era could look like. We conclude that this largely depends on the 
decisions now facing the sport’s administrators and the powerful owners of the biggest 
football clubs: will they prioritise football as the inclusive and diverse game, at the heart 
of local communities? Or will their intrinsic financial interests dominate?
Keywords Soccer. Sports Economics. Sports Finance. Coronavirus. Sports Management.
Summary 1 Introduction. – 2 Finishing the 2019-20 Season. – 3 How Could Football 
be Different in the Post-COVID-19 Era? – 4 Concluding Remarks.
1 Introduction
A deadly airborne virus means social distancing and threatens the entire 
business model of European professional football – sport normally involves 
large gatherings of people, where an airborne virus can spread.1 Following 
the outbreak of COVID-19, by April 2020 practically all major professional 
sports had ground to a halt worldwide. Football leagues were suspended, ei-
1 See Stoecker, Sanders, Barreca 2016 and Cardazzi et al. 2020 for evidence from North Amer-
ica that sports events can increase the mortality from influenza in local areas. See Parnell et al. 
2020 for a discussion of the implications of COVID-19 for mass gatherings and major sports events, 
such as the previously planned 2020 UEFA European Championship.
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ther by themselves or by governments, from the elite level, normally 
played in front of tens of thousands of fans, to the bottom levels, or 
‘grassroots’, played on local parks and recreation grounds.
Football has become an economically important business. In 2018-
19, the twenty highest earning football clubs in the world, all in Eu-
rope and eight of them in England, generated a combined income of 
€9.3 billion (see Deloitte 2020). The growth in European football over 
the past three decades has been remarkable. The most prosperous 
league over that period, the English Premier League (EPL), had broad-
cast rights for 2019-22 valued at £9.2 billion, with around 46% of that 
from overseas (see Svenson 2019). Figure 1 shows how the value of 
the domestic TV rights for the English Premier League increased from 
£61 million per season in 1992 to £1.7 billion by 2016 [fig. 1].
In this chapter, we discuss how this growth industry has been af-
fected by the COVID-19 global pandemic. First, we summarise how 
European football responded to the initial shock and disruption caused 
by the outbreak, mainly focusing on what happened in England. Sec-
ond, we contemplate how football and its business could be different 
in the post COVID-19 era. Finally, we offer some concluding remarks, 
suggesting that the immediate future of European football very much 
depends on the vision and priorities of its principal decision makers.
2 Finishing the 2019-20 Season
As COVID-19 spread globally, sports events that could be postponed 
were postponed, e.g. the Summer Olympic Games and the UEFA Eu-
ropean Football Championship. Annual events that couldn’t be post-
poned were cancelled, e.g. the The Championships, Wimbledon, the 
Boston Marathon and the Formula One Australian Grand Prix. 
The wrangling that took place in the suspended European football 
leagues during the spring of 2020, concerning their resumption or 
otherwise, has made clear that the two most fundamental influenc-
es are government and money.2 In France and the Netherlands (both 
countries with a rich footballing heritage), the football seasons were 
cut short due to the intervention of the respective governments. The 
bans on sports in these countries reached far enough into the sum-
mer that a resumption would be impractical, without affecting the 
start of the next season.
2 Safety played a role too, primarily affecting the timing of resumptions though, 
rather than the decision between cancelling and continuing. In the immediate weeks 
around the peak levels of infection, leagues determined that they could not justify us-
ing scarce national COVID-19 testing resources to ensure the virus was not spread-
ing among the players and other people involved in putting on football matches, even 
if they were resolved to return.
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Other seasons were cut short, such as in the English lower leagues, 
arguably because the decision makers were able to impose particu-
lar outcomes (usually applying points per game before the season was 
suspended), to determine the champions, promotion and relegation, 
without fear of significant adverse financial repercussions from le-
gal action.3 Between 2012 and 2015, a club relegated from the EPL, 
in the best case, suffered a £20 million loss in revenue, and, in the 
worst case, £50 million.4 Conversely, the minimum revenue gain to a 
club from promotion to the EPL in this period was £33 million, and 
the maximum gain was £76 million. Because of these large sums in 
English football that depend on the outcome of a season, the EPL and 
the EFL Championship, the second tier, could not be decided in 2019-
20 by some arbitrary measure, or even a forecast of likely outcomes.
The financial model of football in Europe, but especially in Eng-
land, has changed dramatically in the last thirty years, following 
the formation of the EPL as a breakaway from the English Football 
League. In 1990, average revenues within the English Fourth Divi-
3 Although not all leagues have avoided this issue. Heart of Midlothian F.C. have begun 
legal action against the Scottish Professional Football League after they were relegat-
ed from the top division when it was cut short (https://www.theguardian.com/foot-
ball/2020/jun/15/hearts-legal-action-spfl-relegation-scottish-premiership).
4 These and the following financial values are author calculations using the annu-
al reports filed by football clubs at Companies House, the UK’s registrar of companies 
(https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/companies-house).
Figure 1 Nominal value of domestic broadcast rights for the English Premier League 1992-92 to 2021-22; 
author calculations using SportsBusiness Media Rights Tracker, accessed May 2020
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sion (now League 2) were 12% of those generated by clubs in the 
First Division (now EPL). But in 2015 the equivalent figure was 2%.
Football has operated on a professional basis for almost a century 
and a half, and yet at no point in that time has a set of circumstances 
arisen such as those imposed by COVID-19, where it was financial-
ly unviable, and in some cases legally impossible, to complete sea-
sons. One lesson from the crisis is that a set of revised rules and reg-
ulations regarding the cutting short of seasons is required. Sports 
leagues will need procedures in place that determine the exact meth-
od by which a season will be cut short, if a particular threshold of 
matches has been played, or will instead be abandoned, if too few 
have been played.5 If it is known in advance that points per game, 
weighted or otherwise by other factors (e.g. goals scored, home or 
away form, uncertainty), will be used to decide the season outcomes, 
then leagues can be cut short without fear of legal repercussions.
The increased concentration of money at the top of the game has 
had significant impacts further down the leagues too, since little of 
the revenues coming into the game make their way down to the grass-
roots level. Liberalisation of football’s labour market has resulted in 
a larger proportion of immigrant labour at the top of the game over 
the years, rather than local players making their way up the leagues 
(see for example the Taylor 2007). Opportunities for local young men 
and women to succeed in the game are reduced. In England, the Foot-
ball Association has responsibility for the grassroots, and, along with 
many small town and village clubs, it has lost out on significant sourc-
es of revenues in the summer of 2020 because of COVID-19. Festi-
vals on football pitches and music concerts at stadiums are not only 
part and parcel of the British summer but also the financial viability 
of football outside the elite levels.6 These patterns are not unique to 
English football. Without substantial support from governments or a 
fairer redistribution of wealth in the football pyramid, it seems un-
likely that the rich ecology of association football, down to its grass-
roots, with all its attendant mental and physical health benefits, will 
look the same post COVID-19.
3 How Could Football be Different in the Post-COVID-19 Era?
The future of European football in the post-COVID-19 era largely de-
pends on how soon it will be safe for the fans to return to stadiums, 
and whether they will come back. To the best of our knowledge, there 
5 This happened with the 1939-40 season in England, abandoned after only 3 matches.
6 In June 2020, England’s Football Association announced 124 job losses and expect-
ed losses of £300 million (see https://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/football/53222021).
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is not yet any conclusive evidence regarding how easily the virus is 
transmitted at a large outdoor public gathering such as in a sports 
stadium.7 But regardless, common sense in the ongoing public health 
emergency dictates that fans should not be returning soon.
A vast literature has looked at the effects of crowds on football 
match outcomes (e.g. Garicano, Palacios-Huerta, Prendergast 2005; 
Buraimo, Forrest, Simmons 2010). Along with the familiarity of play-
ing at home and the fatigue from travelling away, the impact of the 
home crowd has been suggested as a factor in accounting for the sub-
stantial home advantage in professional team sports (Schwartz, Bark-
sy 1977), i.e. teams tend to win more often when playing in their own 
stadiums. Two studies of the rare instances when professional Euro-
pean football was played behind closed doors, before COVID-19, have 
found evidence that home advantage was disproportionately eroded 
in these matches (Pettersson-Lidbom, Priks 2010; Reade, Schreyer, 
Singleton 2020). Figure 2 describes the differences between matches 
with fans and without in the latter of these studies, showing that on 
average the normal home advantage was approximately wiped out, 
accounted for by fewer goals scored by home teams [fig. 2]. Referees 
also punished players on the away teams significantly less without 
the pressure from the crowd. However, these results were generally 
based on one-off games behind closed doors. It is not clear whether 
they were driven by the familiarity factor rather than reduced refer-
ee bias. Further, rules have been changed for the football which has 
returned since COVID-19, such as an increased number of substitu-
tions, which could also plausibly affect match outcomes. 
Nonetheless, it has been widely noted that home advantage has not 
only disappeared but even reversed in the first major European league 
to complete its domestic season.8 In the German Bundesliga geister-
spiele (ghost games), from the post-COVID-19 resumption up to the end 
of the 2019-20 season, home teams won just 32% of the matches played 
(26 of 82, compared with 43% in the same season before March). Away 
teams, however, won 45% (37 of 82) of the post-shutdown matches, 
compared with 35% in the season beforehand. Figure 3 summarises 
the trends of home advantage in professional football since 1890, as 
well as what has happened generally since the European virus-induced 
social lockdowns [fig. 3]. When football returned behind closed doors in 
May, home advantage looked to have disappeared, but this has partly 
7 There is some preliminary evidence from North American Sports that the different 
severity in local areas of the initial US outbreak was related to sports events. Aham-
mer, Halla and Lackner (2020) found that NBA (basketball) and NHL (ice hockey) games 
in early March 2020 significantly increased the rate of COVID-19 confirmed cases and 
deaths by the end of April 2020 in the areas surrounding the venues.
8 See for example ESPN, 9th June 2020 (https://www.espn.co.uk/football/german-
bundesliga/story/4107639/).
Innovation in Business, Economics & Finance 1 354
A New World Post COVID-19, 349-358
recovered throughout June, perhaps as teams have become more fa-
miliar with the lack of fans in their stadiums.
Why does home advantage matter in football? Home advantage 
ensures that a weak team in its own stadium has a good chance of 
beating a strong visiting team (Forrest et al. 2005). If the reduction 
in home advantage without fans is greater for weaker teams, then 
stronger teams will win more often, and the competitive balance of 
leagues will be reduced. Studies have found that the demand for foot-
ball on television is increased by the uncertainty of the match outcome 
(e.g. Buraimo, Simmons 2009; Cox 2018; Schreyer, Schmidt, Torgler 
2018a, 2018b). This suggests that TV audience demand for European 
football could be affected if matches remain behind closed doors. Re-
duced home advantage should increase the attractiveness of matches 
featuring a strong home team and a weak away team, and vice versa 
when those relative strengths are reversed. In addition, there could be 
a second effect on demand, as changes in home advantage that are not 
equally distributed over team strengths would tend to affect the com-
petitiveness of overall league championships and the interest of fans.
It is also not clear that matchday revenues will recover quickly 
when fans can return to stadiums. One argument is that there will 
be a pent-up demand effect, that could offset or override the nega-
tive demand effects from any ongoing risk of COVID-19 infection. Two 
of the most sustained attendance increases in the history of English 
Figure 2 Differences in sample means of football match outcomes: closed doors vs with fans, 
2002-03/2019-20. Uses all matches in the UEFA Champions League, Europa League, Italian Serie A, Serie B, 
Serie C, Coppa Italia and French Ligue 1 since the beginning of the 2002-03 season. SOT is Shots on Target. 
See details in Reade, Schreyer, Singleton 2020
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football came after the suspensions brought about by each World War 
(e.g. Dobson, Goddard 1995). But this is a tentative parallel at best. 
Reade and Singleton (2020) found that in the initial stages of the Eu-
ropean COVID-19 outbreak there were already substantial negative 
demand responses, suggestively because of the implied risk of infec-
tion, even when the significance of the disease and its implications 
were being widely played down.
The elite European football clubs are likely to survive the outbreak 
financially, given their continued access to substantial funds besides 
match-day gate receipts. But professional football below that level 
still relies on ticket revenues. By studying the 2018-19 accounts of 
professional football clubs in England and Wales, Szymanski (2020) 
found that the majority of these businesses were already on the verge 
of insolvency before the loss of revenues and write-down of assets, 
i.e. player valuations, due to COVID-19.9 If the present structures of 
professional football are to survive, then some consolidation will be 
needed. Szymanski (2020) notes that much of football club debt is 
owed to other clubs, in the form of delayed player transfer payments. 
Therefore, if any club goes bankrupt it has knock-on effects for oth-
ers, both domestic and foreign, potentially leading to financial conta-
gion. He suggests that the consolidation of the national football busi-
ness model should involve assigning the valuable future broadcast 
rights from the top league to a collective fund, from which those un-
able to collect unpaid debts can make claims, including for delayed 
transfer fees and player wages. In other words, the only way to save 
9 This research was presented at the Reading Online Sport Economics Seminars 
(ROSES) on 17 April 2020. See here for a public recording: https://www.youtube.com/
watch?time_continue=4006&v=viPqe93rW2c&feature=emb_logo.
Figure 3 Professional football result outcomes since 1890 (left panel), and between January 2016 to June 2020 
(right panel). H refers to home wins, D refers to draws and A refers to away wins. Uses all matches in the top leagues 
of 108 countries or regions since 1890, 82 countries since January 2016, and 29 in May and June 2020. 
Author calculations using https://www.worldfootball.net/
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the existing professional football pyramids today is to leverage the 
future value of football after COVID-19.
4 Concluding Remarks
The financial pressures facing most firms in the European football 
industry will be acute unless drastic collective actions are taken. 
The benefactor club owners have deep but not bottomless pockets, 
nor endless patience. Major football clubs and national associations 
will need to prioritise their resources. The women’s game has been 
an area of substantial growth in participation and interest in recent 
years.10 Given the potential for further growth in this area and oth-
ers, football’s decision makers could find opportunities within any 
consolidation. By diverting some of the resources held by the pow-
erful elite leagues, which currently feather superstar players’ nests 
and tickle billionaire owners’ egos, such as in the EPL, they could 
make longer-term investments in the health of the European football 
industry. The football labour market is also overdue for reform. In 
the 2019-20 season, EPL clubs paid £263 million in fees to the agents 
representing players.11 The influence of these agents should be cur-
tailed, as it represents next to nothing in added value to the sport, 
but sees large sums of money exiting it, which could be used to prop 
up the rest of the pyramid and invest in the women’s game. Given the 
public good that football can deliver, in terms of public health and 
social cohesion, there may be a case for state intervention, not only 
to support the industry financially but also to force a re-evaluation 
of whom the beautiful game ultimately serves.
10 For example, in England, 11.7 million watched England’s defeat to USA at the 2019 
FIFA Women’s World Cup, compared with a peak of 2.4 million four years before in the 
previous World cup (see https://www.theguardian.com/football/blog/2020/jan/02/
womens-football-decade-of-progress-2020).
11 See for example BBC Sport, 24 June 2020; https://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/foot-
ball/53170215.
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